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Abstract
The randomized trial literature has helped to renew the fields of microeconometric policy
evaluation by emphasizing identification issues raised by endogenous program participation.
Measurement and attrition issues have perhaps received less attention. This paper analyzes
the dramatic impact of sample attrition in a large job search experiment. We take advantage
of two independent surveys on the same initial sample of 8, 000 persons. The first one is a
long telephone survey that had a strikingly low and unbalanced response rate of about 50%.
The second one is a combination of administrative data and a short telephone survey targeted
at those leaving the unemployment registers; this enriched data source has a balanced and
much higher response rate (about 80%). With naive estimates that neglect non responses,
these two sources yield puzzlingly different results.
Using the enriched administrative data as benchmark, we find evidence that estimates
from the long telephone survey lack external and internal validity. We turn to existing
methods to bound the effects in the presence of sample selection; we extend them to the
context of randomization with imperfect compliance. The bounds obtained from the two
surveys are compatible but those from the long telephone survey are somewhat uninformative.
We conclude on the consequences for data collection strategies.
1 Introduction
Sample attrition that occurs between the initial randomization and the measurement of out-
comes is a major threat to the validity of randomized field experiments. Random assignment
∗We would like to thank ANPE, Une´dic and DARES for their involvement in the experiment from which the
data are drawn, and for their financial support to the evaluation. Lucie Gadenne provided outstanding research
assistance.
†Paris School of Economics (Inra), Crest and J-PAL
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to treatment creates a treatment group and a control group that are at the same time compa-
rable and representative of the initial population. In the presence of sample attrition, however,
the observed treatment and control groups may not be comparable anymore, threatening the
internal validity of the experiment; and they may not be representative of the initial population,
threatening its external validity.
In this paper, we analyze the consequences of sample attrition, in the context of a job search
experiment in which the attrition and the measurement of outcomes posed specific challenges.
The experiment took place in France over 12 months in 2007, in 10 different regions and involved
the randomization of more than 200, 000 job seekers1. The treatment groups were offered inten-
sive counseling and monitoring services. Two distinct programs were actually tested: the first
one was provided directly by the caseworkers of the French public employment agency (ANPE);
the second one was supplied by private firms mandated by the French unemployment benefit
provider (Une´dic). Each program aimed at serving about 40,000 people over a year; however,
unemployed workers randomized into treatment were free to participate or not, and the actual
take-up rates (around 50%) implied that the programs had to be offered to about twice as many
people. This extremely realistic setting – the “experimental” policy was actually a full-scale
trial on a significant part of the French territory – gives the experiment high external validity.
However, it also complicates the measurement of outcomes. In this paper, we focus on the
methodological lessons learned from measuring the impact on transitions from unemployment
to employment and on the type of job held.
Our approach can be briefly summarized: we take advantage of two independent sources
available for part of the experimental sample. The first one is a long telephone survey designed
for more than 8, 000 persons that had a strikingly low response rate of about 50% (thereafter:
“the long telephone survey”). The second one is a combination of administrative data and a short
telephone survey targeted at those leaving the unemployment registers (thereafter: “the enriched
administrative data”); this enriched data has a much higher response rate (about 80%). With
naive estimates that neglect non responses, these two sources yield puzzlingly different results.
We then turn to existing methods providing bounds on the effects in the presence of sample
selection; we extend them to the context of randomization with imperfect compliance. The
bounds obtained from the two surveys are compatible but those from the long telephone survey
are somewhat uninformative. We conclude on the consequences for data collection strategies.
This methodological paper relates to two strands of literature. The first one, following
Horowitz and Manski (2000), develops approaches to bound effects in the presence of sample
selection. In particular, Lee (2008) proposes sharp bounds under the assumption that selection
is a monotonous function of treatment assignment. Our contribution is to extend Lee’s frame-
work to the case of imperfect compliance and to estimate bounds associated with local average
treatment effects (LATE). Second, our paper relates to the empirical literature on unemploy-
1L. Behaghel, B. Cre´pon, M. Gurgand and J. Guitard were in charge of designing the experiment and conducting
the evaluation.
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ment duration. Given its use of experimental data, it of course relates to the few existing job
search experiments such as those reviewed by Meyer (1995). But given its focus on the mea-
surement of exit from unemployment to employment, it also closely relates to the literature on
the impact of unemployment benefit exhaustion. In particular, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007a
and 2007b) show the importance of considering exit to re-employment rather than simply exit
from registered unemployment as the outcome. In their review of the literature (in the working
paper version), they also illustrate the role played by different data sources (administrative,
large standard surveys like CPS, and ad hoc telephone surveys). What you measure and how
you measure it matters a lot when it gets to exit from unemployment. We add a slightly dif-
ferent but complementary warning: our example shows (in a way that somehow surprised us)
how non responses suffices to generate estimates that look economically sizeable and statistically
significant – but are also spurious. This is a serious concern in view of the fact that detailed
outcomes, such as the quality of jobs or even re-employment, are, in some cases, only available
through surveys that can be subject to high attrition rates.
The next section presents the experiment and the data in more details. Section 3 shows
“naive” results without taking into account sample selection. Section 4 provides evidence of
sample selection. Section 5 discusses, extends and estimates bounds on the effects. Section 6
discusses alternative data collection strategies.
2 The programs, the experiment and the data
2.1 The programs
Since the 1980s, the French labor market has been characterized by high unemployment rates
and persistent long-term unemployment. At the beginning of the two programs, unemployment
was decreasing but 8.4 % of the labor force was still unemployed; among them, about 30% had
been unemployed for a year at least.
In the mid 2000s, the French employment benefit provider (Une´dic) had locally experimented
with supplying counseling to unemployment benefit claimants who had a high statistical risk of
long-term unemployment. Private firms (temporary agencies or firms specialized in the place-
ment of job seekers) provided the counseling. Une´dic decided to scale up this program, targeting
41,000 job seekers (exclusively among those eligible for unemployment benefits) in 2007. Each
job seeker was to receive intensive counseling during up to six months. The payment to private
firms was partly conditioned on re-employment of the job seeker. It typically had three equal
shares: 1/3 at the beginning of the counseling; 1/3 if the job seeker found a job in the first six
months (indefinite duration contract or fixed-term contract for at least 6 months); 1/3 if the
worker was still employed after 6 months. In what follows, we call Une´dic-mandated counseling
the “private scheme”.
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Simultaneously but separately, the French employment public agency (ANPE) decided to
launch its own in-house program of intensive counseling. In addition to the population targeted
by Une´dic, the program also targeted job seekers who were not eligible for unemployment ben-
efits. Each job seeker was also to receive intensive counseling during up to six months and the
target was to start the program with 40,000 job seekers in 2007. In what follows, ANPE in-house
program is called the “public scheme”.
The exact content of the programs varied locally. However the basic structure was the same
everywhere and across the two programs: a more intensive follow-up, with at least a weekly
contact (email, phone) and a monthly face-to-face meeting between the job seeker and his per-
sonal counselor. Compared to the usual track, where a contact is supposed to take place every
month and where ANPE agents follow on average 120 job seekers, this is a significant increase in
human resources dedicated to follow the job seeker. In contrast to comparable job search exper-
iments in the US (Meyer, 1995; Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Descheˆnes, 2005), the treatments did
not directly include stricter enforcement of search requirements, even though the more frequent
interactions with counselors may be viewed as increased monitoring.
2.2 Experimental design
The populations concerned by the two programs partially overlapped. Benefit recipients were
eligible for ANPE-provided counseling and Une´dic-mandated counseling in regions where the
two programs coexisted. In some regions, only one program was experimented. Moreover,
job seekers who were not eligible for benefits over a sufficient period (1 year) were not eligible
for Une´dic-mandated counseling. Setting apart job seekers that had already been unemployed
for three months at the beginning of the experiment, this defines four populations: (i) benefit
recipients in regions with the two programs; (ii) benefit recipients in regions with ANPE-provided
counseling only; (iii) benefit recipients in regions with Une´dic-mandated counseling only; (iv)
non recipients (eligible only for the public scheme). For the sake of simplicity, in the analysis
below, we estimate average treatment effects on these heterogenous populations by pooling the
different sub-samples together and using fixed effects to control for differences in populations.
The effects of the private and public schemes are thus computed on different populations and
are not directly comparable. This comparison is not the topic of interest here; we consider it in
separate, on-going work.
The randomization took place during the first interview at the local ANPE branch (that is, at
registration as unemployed). After the job seeker had been diagnosed eligible for the program(s),
a software installed on the computer of the employment service agent randomly assigned him to
treatment 1 (public scheme), treatment 2 (private scheme) or to the control group (usual track).
The probabilities of assignment to each group varied locally and across the four populations so
as to maximize the power of the statistical evaluation while complying with the quantitative
objectives of each program (the objectives of 40,000 and 41,000 job seekers had been subdivided
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locally). This often implied very high probabilities of assignment to treatment 2 (up to 85%)
and much lower probabilities of assignment to treatment 1 (down to 6%) and to control (down
to 9%).
Upon randomization, the job seeker was told by the employment service agent which track
he was offered. The job seeker was free to refuse the more intensive tracks. Depending on the
assignment and on his early decision during the first interview, he was afterwards contacted
either by ANPE services for the usual track, or by a dedicated counselor from the ANPE-
provided intensive scheme, or by one of the private firms mandated by Une´dic. Job seekers
of the two treatment groups effectively entered the program they were assigned to by signing a
specific agreement; if they refused to sign, did not show up, or were eventually found not to meet
the criteria of the intensive scheme, they went back to the usual track. Thus, a significant share
of each treatment group (about 55%) did not actually enter the scheme they were assigned to.
Following the usual terminology, they are non-compliers. The high rates of non compliance were
expected and had been taken into account in the statistical power calculations; along with the
unbalanced assignment probabilities, they are a factor limiting the precision of the evaluation.
This appears as a price to pay for this large-scale, realistic setting; it is fortunately counteracted
by the large samples.
2.3 The data
The data gathered for the evaluation comes from a variety of sources. We focus here on the two
sources that are used to measure employment.
The first source is a telephone survey (the “long telephone survey”) that took place in March
and April 2008. The initial sample included 9011 job seekers of the four populations who had
entered the experiment between April and June 2007. Job seekers had therefore been assigned
for about 10 months when they were surveyed. The sample was stratified according to the job
seekers’ random assignment and to whether they had signed or not for an intensive scheme. The
interviews were conducted by an independent pollster mandated by the French Ministry of Labor
(DARES). The questionnaire was long (a maximum of 103 questions, for an estimated average
time of 20 minutes). Detailed questions were asked upon the track followed when unemployed
(what they were proposed, whether they accepted or not, why, what they did,...) and on the
current employment situation. The first question of interest here is: “Question 73. What is
your current situation today? 1. Employment (wage earner or not, including the creation of
a firm, if effective). 2. Project of creating a firm. 3. Internship, studies. 4. Unemployment. 5.
Retirement, early retirement (...). 6. Out of the labor force (...).”From this, we create the binary
outcome “employment” equal to 1 if the person chose response 1, 0 otherwise. When employed
the individual was also asked whether his job was under an indefinite duration contract, and
whether it was part-time or full-time. We create the binary outcome “permanent employment”
equal to 1 if the person was employed in a full-time, indefinite duration job.
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The next two sources are the administrative records held by ANPE on all registered unem-
ployment spells and a short telephone survey. The administrative file held by ANPE is used here
to measure the time spent in registered unemployment. As is well known and well illustrated
by Card et al. (2007a), the end of a registered spell may be due to quite different events. In
our data, it is in some cases clear whether the job seeker has found a job or decided to exit the
labor force (for about 50% of ending spells, the job seeker returned a form stating his motives or
the information was coded directly by the employment services during an interview or a phone
contact); but in about 50% of cases, there is no way to know from the administrative records
whether the job seeker had found a job or not. As part of the experimental design, a very short
phone survey was therefore mandated to an independent pollster, on a subsample of workers
whose destination at the exit from unemployment was unknown from the administrative source.
The questionnaire was extremely focused so as to actually mimic the form that other job seekers
had filled out upon exiting registered unemployment. It had a maximum of 4 questions. We
are using the first one: “Question 1. During the month of ..., you stopped being registered
at ANPE. What was the reason?” The sampling probabilities for this survey were optimized
to partly correct for the imbalance between treatment and control groups. Moreover, to avoid
recall error, the survey was implemented monthly on those who had recently left the unemploy-
ment registers. Thus combined, the administrative records of registered unemployment spells
and the short phone survey allow us to measure transitions from registered unemployment to
employment at various horizons. We call the corresponding binary outcome variable “exit to
employment”.
It is worth noticing that the “employment” variable (from the long telephone survey) and the
“exit to employment”variable (from the enriched administrative data) measure conceptually and
practically distinct outcomes. This is first due to the fact that not all job seekers who have a job
exit registered unemployment. It is indeed possible for a worker who has a part-time or unstable
job to remain registered as a job seeker (his unemployment benefits being adjusted according
to his earnings). He will not, in this case, be recorded as transiting from unemployment to
employment; he will, however, be reported as employed in the long telephone survey. Second,
this is due to the fact that the date of the information is not strictly identical in the two sources.
For example, job seekers may have exited registered unemployment to employment, but may
have lost their jobs by the time of the long telephone survey. We come back to this measurement
difference when comparing the results from the two sources.
Another difference between the two sources lies in their very different response rates. Table
1 shows the (weighted and unweighted) size of the three samples we use: the full sample, for
which only administrative records are available, the enriched administrative data, and the long
telephone survey data. The response rate of the long telephone survey is 50%, much lower
than the response rate in the enriched administrative data (81.2%). The full sample has 8137
observations: indeed, from the initial 9011 job seekers, we disregard those areas or periods that
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did not yield individuals in the control group as well as in at least one of the treatment groups,
as well as two regions where the enforcement of the experiment was problematic.
3 Naive results without correcting for sample selection
Table 2 shows naive estimates of treatment effects. More precisely, for each data source, we
restrict the analysis to job seekers for whom the outcome variable is available. The approach is
naive in the sense that we do not attempt to make any correction for sample selectivity at that
stage.
As discussed above, compliance to the randomized assignment was imperfect. We therefore
display intention-to-treat estimates (ITT, panel A) as well as local average treatment effects
(LATE, panel B). Moreover, the probability of assignment to the different experimental groups
varied locally. We control for this by introducing a set of dummy variables, one for each area in
which a given set of assignment probabilities was used.2
Using only unemployment registers (column 1) yields the largest sample: 8137 job seekers.
Indeed, there is no issue of non response: the unemployment register is an exhaustive source. Job
seekers assigned to the public scheme exit unemployment registers significantly more than those
assigned to the control group. The impact of the private scheme is not statistically significant.
Of course, the economic interpretation of these results is unclear: we do not know whether the
public scheme helped job seekers to find a job, of if their exit from registered unemployment is due
to discouragement or tighter monitoring. The rest of the table therefore uses more meaningful
outcomes, based on our two main data sources. From the enriched administrative data (column
2), we find that the public scheme actually increased exit from unemployment to employment,
whereas the private scheme had virtually no effect. By contrast, the long telephone survey tells a
very different story, suggesting a positive and sizeable impact of the private scheme. Job seekers
of the two treatment groups tend to be more frequently employed (in any job, including those
who remain registered as job seekers while holding a job), even though the difference with the
control group is not statistically significant (column 3). Once the quality of the job is taken into
account, it appears that the private scheme increased the odds of finding a full-time job under
an indefinite duration contract (column 4). The effect is sizeable and highly significant. The
corresponding effect of the public scheme is smaller and marginally significant.
The contrast between these results could be rationalized. After all, the two data sources
measure different outcomes. Moreover, the incentives of private firms hired by Une´dic were
precisely rewarding full-time, long-term jobs. A quick conclusion based on table 2 would be that
the private scheme was only effective at helping job seekers to find high-quality jobs, whereas
the public scheme was effective at helping them find any type of jobs.
2Alternatively, one can use design weights; the results are similar.
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This, however, does not take into account the other difference between the two data sources:
they have very different response rates. Results in column 5 suggests that this matters a lot.
In order to control for differences in measured outcomes and to focus on non-response issues,
we artificially generate an outcome variable that has the same meaning as in the enriched
administrative source, but has the same response distribution as in the long telephone survey.
Namely, we create a second variable measuring exit from unemployment to employment by
combining part of the information of the unemployment registers with the information from the
long telephone survey. This variable is set to missing if the job seeker did not respond to the
survey, to 1 if the job seeker declared to be employed in the long telephone survey and had left
the unemployment registers, to 0 otherwise. In other words, we simply correct for the fact that
some of the employed people in column 3 are still on the unemployment registers, as long as they
are still looking for a better job. Columns 2 and 5 therefore measure the same outcome (exit
from registered unemployment towards employment), but with very different response rates.3
Their comparison therefore tends to isolate the impact of the difference in response rates. This
difference proves to matter a lot: with the enriched administrative data, the private scheme has
no significant effect (the point estimate is 3.2 percentage points and the upper bound of the
confidence interval for the LATE is 15.5); with the long telephone survey, the estimated effect
is large and statistically significant (20.7 with a standard error of 6.4).
Our interpretation of these naive estimations is that, though the two schemes may well have
differentiated impacts on different outcomes, there is a strong suspicion that part of the apparent
positive impact of the private scheme on the probability to find “high-quality” jobs is spuriously
driven by a sample selection bias. The next section provides further evidence of this.
4 Evidence on sample selectivity
We start with some notations using the potential outcome framework. For the sake of simplicity
and without any loss of generality, let us consider two experimental groups only. Z ∈ {0, 1}
denotes the random assignment variable while T ∈ {0, 1} denotes the treatment variable. We
then define potential outcomes for the different assignments (Z = 0 and Z = 1). In general,
the outcome may depend on the realized treatment T as well as on the assignment Z. However,
for each individual, the realized treatment itself is a function of the assignment. This can be
3Note however that the two “exit to employment” variables in columns 2 and 5 may still differ because they are
not measured exactly at the same date. In particular, a job seeker who exited the unemployment registers, found
a job, but lost it by the time of the long telephone survey, will be recorded as exiting to employment in column
2, but not in column 5. When assessing the impact of sample selection in the next section, we overcome this
remaining difficulty by measuring exit to employment in differently selected subsamples, but always only using
the measure of “exit to employment” provided by the enriched administrative dataset.
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summarized in the function y˜(Z):4
y˜(Z) ≡ y(Z, T (Z)).
The observed outcome is y = y˜(1)Z + y˜(0)(1− Z).
In this section, we focus on intention-to-treat effects, in particular on the impact of Z on exit
to employment, denoted by the indicator variable y. The naive ITT estimators of table 2 come
from the OLS estimation of:
y = β0 + β1Z + . (1)
If there was no sample selection issue, we would have β1 = E[y˜(1)− y˜(0)]. This does not need be
the case when the model is estimated on a selected sample. The goal of this section is therefore
to clarify, and if possible to test, to what extent the puzzling discrepancy between results based
on the two surveys may be due to sample selection.
Sample selection may create two sorts of problem. The first one is a problem of external
validity of the naive estimates: as they are estimated on different samples representing different
subpopulations, the naive ITT estimators may be internally valid (they consistently estimate
the effect of the treatment for a population of respondents to a given survey) but lack external
validity (the effect differs from the effect in the complete population). The second problem is
a problem of internal validity : respondents in the control group differ from respondents in the
treatment group, making the comparison irrelevant. To formalize this distinction, we need to
introduce some further notations on response behavior. Response behavior itself may depend on
assignment. In the same way as for outcomes, we define two potential response variables, R˜(0)
and R˜(1), one for each assignment (Z = 0 and Z = 1, respectively). The observed response
behavior is R = R˜(1)Z + R˜(0)(1−Z). With these notations, we can define different parameters
of interest. The first one is the usual intention-to-treat parameter:
ITT = E(y˜(1)− y˜(0)).
The next two are ITT parameters for two populations of respondents:
ITTR1 = E(y˜(1)− y˜(0)|R˜(1) = 1)
and
ITTR0 = E(y˜(1)− y˜(0)|R˜(0) = 1).
As will become clear in section 5, ITTR1 is a more interesting parameter in our problem. We
therefore focus on ITTR1 and ITT . With these notations, we will say that the OLS estimator
4As long as we focus on ITT effects, we do not need to introduce the usual potential outcomes y(T ) that depend
on the treatment status T . Also, we do not need to make exclusion restrictions such as y(Z, T (Z)) = y(T (Z)).
We introduce these additional notations and assumptions in the next section, where they become necessary.
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for β1 in (1) on a given sample is internally valid if it is consistent for ITTR1, and externally
(and internally) valid if it is consistent for ITT .
The conflicting results in table 2 are a clear indication that sample selection creates a problem
of external validity for the naive estimation in at least one of the two samples. Indeed, if the
naive estimators based on each of the two surveys are consistent for ITT , we expect them to be
very close (note that their estimation samples partly overlap): this is not the case for the impact
of the private scheme. The main question that remains is whether there is also a problem of
internal validity. Can we provide evidence that the naive estimators lack internal validity, in
particular in the long telephone survey where response rates are so low ? For this, contrasting the
estimates based on the two surveys is not sufficient: if the effect of the treatment is heterogenous,
it might well be the case that E(y˜(1) − y˜(0)|R˜tel(1) = 1) 6= E(y˜(1) − y˜(0)|R˜adm(1) = 1) (the
subscript adm and tel characterize response in the administrative data and in the long telephone
survey, respectively); therefore, the estimators in columns 2 and 5 of table 2 need not converge
to the same value.
Sufficient condition for internal validity: non response ignorability
However, what we can do is to test one of the natural conditions for internal validity, which
we call “non-response ignorability” (by analogy with the notion of “treatment ignorability”):
y˜(0) ⊥ (R˜(1), R˜(0)).
Under non response ignorability, the naive estimators are internally valid, in the sense that they
consistently estimate ITTR1. 5
Non response ignorability is usually not testable. Indeed, the distribution of y˜(0) is typically
only observed for those with R˜(0) = 1. The advantage of having two surveys is to make a test
of non response ignorability possible. Indeed, if non response is ignorable in the two surveys,
y˜(0) ⊥ (R˜adm(1), R˜adm(0), R˜tel(1), R˜tel(0)),
then we have
E(y˜(0)|R˜adm(0) = 1, R˜tel(0) = 1) = E(y˜(0)|R˜adm(0) = 1, R˜tel(0) = 0).
These two quantities are identified, as y˜(0) is observed whenever R˜adm(0) = 1. Consequently,
we can test this equation by restricting the sample to the part of the control group for which we
have the administrative information and by testing if
E(y|Rtel = 1, Z = 0) = E(y|Rtel = 0, Z = 0).
5The naive estimators are consistent for E(y|Z = 1, R = 1) − E(y|Z = 0, R = 1). Randomization and non
response ignorability then imply E(y|Z = 1, R = 1) − E(y|Z = 0, R = 1) = E(y˜(1)|R˜(1) = 1) − E(y˜(0)|R˜(0) =
1) = ITTR1.
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The results are displayed on the first line of table 3. With p-value below 1%, we clearly reject
non response ignorability in the long telephone survey, based on the information from the admin-
istrative dataset. More specifically, those who do not respond to the long telephone survey have
a much higher probability to exit unemployment to employment (in the absence of treatment)
than those who respond: 39.6% compared to 31.2%. As a consequence, estimations among re-
spondents to the long telephone survey strongly underestimate the rate of exit to employment
when there is no intensive counseling.
Other conditions for internal validity
It should be noted, however, that non response ignorability is only a sufficient, but not a
necessary condition for internal validity. Formally, the necessary and sufficient condition for
internal validity of the naive estimator is
E(y˜(0)|R˜(1) = 1) = E(y˜(0)|R˜(0) = 1).
Unfortunately, even with two surveys, testing this condition directly is not possible, as it involves
a moment from the joint distribution of y˜(0) and R˜(1), two potential outcomes that are never
simultaneously realized. The condition is therefore impossible to test directly, and also hard to
interpret.
Instead, we can review plausible cases where internal validity holds despite the fact that non
response is not ignorable, and check whether they are compatible with the evidence. The first
obvious one is when R˜(1) = R˜(0) for everyone: those who respond when they are in the control
group are exactly the same as those who respond when they are in the treatment group. Then
E(y˜(0)|R˜(1) = 1) = E(y˜(0)|R˜(0) = 1) is trivial, and the naive estimator consistently estimates
the ITT among respondents. However, R˜(1) = R˜(0) also implies E(R˜(1) = 1) = E(R˜(0) = 1)
which can be tested as E(R|Z = 1) = E(R|Z = 0). Table 4 shows that this is rejected by
the data for the long telephone survey: job seekers respond more when they are assigned to
the private scheme than when assigned to the control group (the response rate increases by 5.6
percentage points, with a standard error of 2.1). The difference is also positive, though smaller
and not statistically significant, for the public scheme.
A second natural case to consider is the case where the effect of the treatment is homogeneous
and the sample selection has the same impact on the control group as on the treatment group.
In other words, though non response is not ignorable (E(y˜(0)|R˜(0) = 1) = E(y˜(0)) + δ with
δ 6= 0), it has no impact on the estimation of the effect of treatment as it impacts the treatment
group in the same way: E(y˜(1)|R˜(1) = 1) = E(y˜(1)) + δ. When comparing the control and
the treatment group, the impact of selection disappears (the two δ’s cancel out). We can use
the two surveys to test if the data supports this story. Taking the administrative survey as a
benchmark, we can test whether
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E(y˜(0)|R˜adm(0) = 1, R˜tel(0) = 1)− E(y˜(0)|R˜adm(0) = 1, R˜tel(0) = 0)
= E(y˜(1)|R˜adm(1) = 1, R˜tel(1) = 1)− E(y˜(1)|R˜adm(1) = 1, R˜tel(1) = 0)
= δ
This is done by comparing the different lines of table 3. The fifth column gives an estimate of
δ for each of the three experimental groups. While the difference between respondents and the
complete population is similar in the control group and in the treatment group assigned to the
public scheme (-3.8 compared with -2.9 percentage points), it is much smaller and not statistically
different from 0 for job seekers assigned to the private scheme (-0.2 percentage points). In other
words, for the three experimental groups, looking at respondents only leads to under estimate the
rate of exit to employment; but the degree of underestimation is significantly lower in the group
assigned to the private scheme. This is evidence against the case of homogeneous treatment
effects and similar impacts of sample selection across experimental groups. Note that sample
selection does not appear to differ in the control group and in the group assigned to the public
scheme. This echoes the finding of table 2 where estimates of the impact of the public scheme
do not differ significantly across the two surveys. The problem of sample selection seems to
specifically affect the job seekers assigned to the private scheme.
Of course, if we allow for heterogenous treatment effects, we may also imagine cases where the
results of table 4 and 3 are compatible with the internal validity of the naive estimators. However,
these cases would arguably be somewhat ad hoc. To sum up, there is a strong suspicion against
the internal validity of the naive estimators in the long telephone survey: the rates of response
differ markedly between the experimental groups, non response is correlated with the exit rate to
employment in the absence of treatment, and the effect of sample selection seems to differ across
experimental groups. If we were still to believe in the internal validity of the naive estimators to
measure an effect on respondents, the lack of external validity would remain problematic: the
results of table 2 would imply that the effect of the private scheme is much higher for respondents
to the long telephone survey than for the average job seeker. Any conclusion on the efficiency
of the program itself would therefore be misguided.
Though this is speculative, tables 4 and 3 suggest a story on the response behavior that may
have created a bias in the long telephone survey. Start from table 3 where we see that job
seekers with better chances to find a job are less likely to respond to the phone survey. One
plausible explanation is that some job seekers have unobserved characteristics that make them
more efficient in their job search, even without any help from the public employment system.
They might therefore not value the help of the public employment system too much and not
wish to respond to a survey it mandates. However, when they receive counseling from a private
company, they may consider it as a useful help and become more willing to respond to surveys.
This would explain why response rates raise with assignment to the private scheme in table 4.
This change in response behavior induced by the treatment also modifies the composition of the
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observable treatment group. Since the new respondents are more efficient in their job search,
they drive the exit rate in the treatment group upward through a composition effect rather than
through the causal effect of the intensive counseling. They create an upward bias. As for those
assigned to the public scheme, they may be less sensitive to the change, as the service is still
provided in house by the ANPE. The change in response behavior, hence the bias, would be
lower (and not detected statistically in our data). Of course, this is just one story. However, it
helps make the point that sample selectivity is a serious issue in the long telephone survey and
that we need approaches that are robust to such selection. We turn to this in the next section.
5 Non response and bounds
5.1 Estimators
Manski and Horowitz (2000) propose to use the fact that a variable is bounded to derive bounds
on its mean when there is non response. In our case, this yields a worst-case scenario where
all missing outcomes are set to 0 in the treatment group and to 1 in the control group, and a
best-case scenario where they are set to 1 in the treatment group and to 0 in the control group.
The width of the resulting identifiable interval for the effect of the treatment is equal to the sum
of the non-response rates in the two groups. With response rates slightly above 50% and 80%,
these bounds are uninformative.
Lee (2008) proposes an alternative approach that provides sharp bounds on ITT effects in
the case where selection is monotonic with regard to random assignment. He applies these
bounds to an experiment where selection is due to the fact that the outcome, wages, is only
observed for those who get a job. However, he also suggests that his approach can be used in
the case where selection is due to survey non response. To follow this route, we need to take into
account two features of our data. First, the outcome itself is bounded: the employment status
is a binary variable. This allows us to consider a slightly different estimand than Lee, with
two advantages: the population covered can be larger and the bounds tighter. Second, there is
imperfect compliance to the initial randomized assignment; we therefore extend the approach to
the estimation of intention-to-treat effects (ITT) and to local average treatment effects (LATE)
on “responding compliers”, i.e. those who are induced to receive the treatment by the random
assignment and who respond to the survey.
5.1.1 Bounds under perfect compliance
For the sake of simplicity, we proceed in two steps, first considering the case where compliance
is perfect, so as to make the comparison with Lee’s approach transparent. We consider the
standard potential outcome framework in a simpler version than in the previous section. We
define a treatment variable T ∈ {0, 1}, two potential outcomes y(1) and y(0) and assume random
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assignment to treatment. We consider the case where there is non response in the output
variable and we introduce potential response R(1) and R(0). R(j) is the response behavior
when assigned to treatment j. The response behavior is therefore R = R(0)(1− T ) +R(1)T . In
that context, it is perfectly feasible to use Lee’s approach to derive bounds for the parameter
E(y(1)−y(0)|R(1) = 1, R(0) = 1), i.e. the average treatment effect for the“always respondents”.
However, given the fact that y(0) is bounded here, we can also provide bounds for the parameter
E(y(1)− y(0)|R(1) = 1), i.e. the average treatment effect for the “respondents if treated”.
Noting ∆R = E(y(1)− y(0)|R(1) = 1)6, we have the following proposition :
Proposition 1 Assuming
1. The output variables are bounded:
y (k) ∈ [m,M ] , k ∈ {0, 1}
2. Monotonicity of response behavior:7
R(1) ≥ R(0)
then in the presence of non response the parameter ∆R cannot be identified from the data but it
belongs to an identifiable interval whose lower and upper bounds ∆R and ∆R are:
∆R =
(
E (yR |T = 1)− E (yR |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 1)−M(E (R |T = 1)− E (R |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 1)
∆R =
(
E (yR |T = 1)− E (yR |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 1)−m(E (R |T = 1)− E (R |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 1)
The length of the interval is
∆R −∆R = (M −m)
(
E (R |T = 1)− E (R |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 1) .
It depends on the difference in the response rates and not on their sum as it is the case for
Horowitz-Manski bounds which are obtained without any assumptions on the response behavior.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix. The proposition itself calls for two comments.
First, let us compare it to the bounds based on Lee (2008). Here, given the fact that the outcome
is binary, the quantiles that appear in Lee’s formulas are replaced by 0 or 1. Note ΓR and ΓR
Lee’s bounds for E(y(1)− y(0)|R(1) = 1, R(0) = 1). The length of the interval is
ΓR − ΓR = (M −m)
(
E (R |T = 1)− E (R |T = 0) )/E (R |T = 0) .
6?? It is the same parameter as ITTR1 in the previous part.
7Alternatively, monotonicity could be defined by R(1) ≤ R(0). In our application, however, response rates are
higher in the treatment groups.
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Clearly, when treatment status does not affect response behavior (i.e. R(1) = R(0)), the
two intervals are identical and empty. In general, however, there are observations such that
R(1) > R(0), so that the interval is not empty and ∆R − ∆R < ΓR − ΓR. Moreover, under
the assumption that R(1) ≥ R(0), the population of the “respondents if treated” includes the
population of the “always respondents”. To summarize, compared to E(y(1) − y(0)|R(1) =
1, R(0) = 1), E(y(1)−y(0)|R(1) = 1) covers a larger population and yields a smaller identifiable
interval. Given this advantage, we decide to focus on that parameter. It should be noted,
however, that this is made possible by the fact that y(0) is bounded, allowing us to bound
E(y(0)|R(1) = 1, R(0) = 0). In a more general case where y(0) is not bounded, Lee’s bounds
are the only choice.
A second point of comparison with Lee (2008) is to ask whether the monotonicity assumption
is plausible here. The assumption may at first seem innocuous. As noted by Lee (2008), this
assumption is embedded in any standard model of sample selection that writes an additive latent
selection model such as
R = 1 if and only if R∗ ≥ 0 where R∗ = α+ βT + v.
Moreover, the appendix shows that the assumption of monotonicity can be stated in a way that
more closely relates to our data collection process, that comprised multiple attempts to reach the
job seeker. We call this the “extended monotonicity” assumption. The attempts to reach people
involve purely random components (orthogonal to assignment). Once the job seeker is reached in
a given attempt j, we make the behavioral assumption that his response behavior is monotonic
with regard to assignment: Rj(1) ≥ Rj(0). In this slightly more general framework, the results
of proposition 1 still hold. However, we have to assume monotonic response behavior for each
attempt j and that the probability to reach the job seeker is not affected by the assignment.
Nevertheless, this model of response behavior can still be problematic in our application.
Assume for instance that the impact of treatment on response behavior is twofold: (i) treated
job seekers are more satisfied with the public employment system, and therefore more prone
to respond to surveys; (ii) treated job seekers are more likely to find a job, to move, and are
therefore less likely to be reached for the interview. If there is heterogeneity in these effects, one
can imagine that R(1) > R(0) for job seekers for whom effect (i) dominates, and R(1) < R(0)
when effect (ii) dominates.
The bottom line is that the monotonicity assumption cannot be taken for granted, even
though it is clearly much less demanding than the assumption that non response is ignorable.
We therefore consider results based on this assumption as tentative only. They can be seen from
two perspectives: are the bounds useful to reconcile the contradictory results obtained when
using the two data sources? More speculatively, if the monotonicity assumption holds, does it
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enable us to recover interesting information from the long telephone survey despite its low and
unbalanced response rates?
5.1.2 Bounds under imperfect compliance
As a second step, we now extend the framework to the case of imperfect compliance. This setting
is frequently used in practice when conducting an experiment. It is for example the case with
the so-called encouragement design (see Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer, 2007). We consider the
potential outcome framework with random assignment to treatment and imperfect compliance
of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). Z ∈ {0, 1} is the variable related to assignment and
T ∈ {0, 1} is the final treatment status. The potential treatment variables are T (0) and T (1)
(corresponding to Z = 0 or Z = 1, respectively). Potential outcomes are y(t, z), with t ∈ {0, 1}
and z ∈ {0, 1}. We consider the usual set of assumptions of the Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
model:
Assumption 1 1. SUTVA
2. Monotonicity T (1) ≥ T (0)
3. Exclusion y(t, z) = y(t)
4. Randomness y(1), y(0), T (1), T (0)⊥Z
It is well known that under this set of assumptions, the usual Wald estimator identifies the
Local Average Treatment Effect
∆Late =
E (y |Z = 1)− E (y |Z = 0)
E (T |Z = 1)− E (T |Z = 0) = E (y (1)− y (0) |T (1)− T (0) = 1)
We consider the case where there is non response and we introduce potential response behavior
R (t, z). We make the following assumptions
Assumption 2 1. Exclusion R(t, z) = R(t)
2. Monotonicity of response behavior
R(1) > R(0)
The response behavior only depends on the treatment and not on the assignment to treatment.
The parameter of interest we consider is the Local Average Treatment Effect on “responding
compliers”: ∆Late,R = E(y(1)− y(0)|(T (1)− T (0))R(1) = 1).
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Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the parameter ∆Late,R cannot be iden-
tified but it belongs to an identifiable interval which Lower and Upper bounds ∆Late,R and ∆Late,R
defined by
∆Late,R =
E (yR |Z = 1)− E (yR |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0) −M
E (R |Z = 1)− E (R |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0)
and
∆Late,R =
E (yR |Z = 1)− E (yR |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0) −m
E (R |Z = 1)− E (R |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0)
The proof is in the appendix. Notice that the size of the interval is
∆Late,R −∆Late,R = (M −m) .
E (R |Z = 1)− E (R |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0)
As in the previous case, it is a function of the difference in the response rates but here in
addition it depends on the compliance rate for the respondents. A low rate of compliance leads
to a widening of the bounds.
For inference purposes, note that the bounds on the ATE among responding compliers have
the form of Wald estimands. For instance, we can rewrite
∆Late,R =
E ((y −M)R |Z = 1)− E ((y −M)R |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0)
This quantity can be estimated by the Wald estimator of the impact of TR on (y −M)R
using Z as an instrument. Standard errors follow as usual.
To summarize, Lee’s approach can be extended and applied to our problem of non response
with imperfect compliance. Some gains can be made using the fact that the outcome is bounded.
The generalization to LATE is fairly direct, although imperfect compliance leads to larger iden-
tifiable intervals. The main caveat is that the monotonicity assumption is arguably a strong
assumption in that context.
5.2 Results
The resulting bounds are displayed on table 5, which parallels the naive estimations of table
2. Arguably, selection is less likely to be incidental with the enriched administrative data, and
bounds are not needed. If we do use bounds, this does not substantially modify the previous
findings: as the response rates are very close in the different experimental groups, the estimated
identifiable intervals are narrow. Like in table 2, the private scheme has no detectable effect on
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exit from unemployment registers to employment. The effect of the public scheme is positive,
statistically significant and sizeable: the lower bound of the LATE estimate shows that exit has
increased by 13.6 percentage points (standard error of 5.3), which corresponds to an increase of
about 1/3 starting from an exit rate around 35%.
By contrast, using bounds considerably modifies the message from the long telephone survey.
The wide estimated intervals are due to two things: first, the large difference in response rates
between job seekers assigned to the private scheme (and, to a lesser extent, to the public scheme)
and job seekers assigned to the control group; second, the low take-up of the treatment. The lower
bound of the effect even becomes negative when considering the impact of the private scheme
on permanent employment (full-time employment under indefinite duration contract). However,
the corresponding upper bound is also very high (21.7 percentage points with a standard error of
8.7 percentage points). We can neither reject the hypothesis that the program has been highly
effective, nor rule out that it has been detrimental. The same applies for other outcomes and to
the impact of the public scheme. Clearly, in the case of the long telephone survey, using bounds
to get estimates that are robust to (monotonous) non response leads to uninformative results.
The comparison between estimates in columns 1 and 4 is of particular interest: what becomes
the puzzle of conflicting results between the two surveys when sample selectivity is taken into
account? The estimated identifiable intervals for the two programs now overlap (even without
taking into account sampling error): the contradiction disappears, even if we assume that the
effects are homogeneous. This is reassuring, but it comes at a high cost: taking into account
sample selection has reconciled the two surveys, but it has also recognized that the long telephone
survey could hardly be used. This means that we cannot test the prediction that the private
scheme was specifically effective in raising employment in stable and full-time jobs, as implied
by the incentives set by Une´dic.
6 Conclusion
The previous section has explored statistical solutions to the issue of non response in the context
of a large job search experiment. The results are mixed: even though the bounding approach can
reconcile initially puzzling results, it does not yield informative estimates on interesting outcomes
such as transition to stable, full-time jobs. Moreover, we had to assume non response mono-
tonicity, which may be a strong assumption. This concluding section explores the consequences
for data collection strategies.
There is a strong tendency in the literature to rely on increasingly rich administrative data
sources, as exemplified by Swedish and Norwegian administrative data. In our case, given the
limitations of the unemployment registers, this has proven useful as long as we have been able
to supplement insufficient information through a short phone survey. However, this is far from
being a panacea, for three reasons. First, non response to the survey remains a potential issue,
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although we found no evidence of sample selection bias in our enriched administrative data
set. Second, the outcome measured (transition from registered unemployment to employment),
though relevant, remains a limited one. A possibility would be to rely on other administrative
sources: social security records, matched with our sample, could in principle provide some
information on the type of job. However, and this is the third limitation, there are delays in
obtaining and matching such data. In the context of our experiment, ANPE and Une´dic needed
results quickly. Though gathering more and better administrative data is a route we are pursuing
in this research, it cannot be the solution for the (short-term) political demand.
The comparison of the enriched administrative data and the long telephone survey suggests
that surveys may sometimes be irreplaceable to get information on detailed outcomes (quality of
the job, type of contract, for instance). Surveys therefore still have a role to play in experimental
evaluations. As we have learned that non response can make these surveys useless, the question
is whether we can implement them in a way that minimizes the consequence of non response.
We believe that it could be useful to design surveys so as to be able to identify sample selection
models. This requires instruments that impact response behavior but are independent from
treatment assignment. In on-going work, we show that these instruments can be generated
following the same basic principle as for treatment assignment: randomization. The idea is to
randomly vary the effort with which information is obtained. If this generates sufficient (random)
differences in response rates, pointwise identification of treatment effects becomes possible again.
Applying this idea in practice is the next challenge.
The randomized trial literature has helped to renew the field of microeconometric policy
evaluation by emphasizing identification issues raised by endogenous program participation.
Measurement and attrition issues have received less attention. The lesson of this job search
experiment is that the measurement of the outcomes and the response rates can significantly
impact the results. Attrition bias should therefore be as serious a concern as endogenous program
participation. We believe that the same inventiveness shown in tackling the latter problem could
be usefully directed toward designing surveys and developing estimators to address the former.
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Appendix: Proof of propositions 1-2
We prove results in the more general case where response monotonicity is replaced by extended
monotonicity. Results under monotonicity hold a fortiori. Extended monotonicity is defined as
follows:
Assumption 3 Extended Monotonicity
The potential response behaviors for j in (0,1) are of the form
R (j) = G (B (j) ,∆ (j))
with B (j)′ = (B1 (j) , . . . , BK (j)) and ∆ (j)′ = (∆1 (j) , . . . ,∆L (j)) for some K and L. Where
:
• R (j) ∈ {0, 1}
• G is non decreasing in each component Bk(j)
• Bk(j) satisfy monotonicity : Bk(1) ≥ Bk(0)
• B(j) are independent from T
• ∆(j) are ignorable for j ∈ {0, 1}
• ∆(0) and ∆(1) have the same distribution
One example could be the following : there are K attempts to reach people and the Bk(j) ∈
{0, 1} could be the desired response behavior at the kth attempt, but there may be purely random
departure from this desired response behavior, and the observed response is ∆k(j)Bk(j) where
the components ∆k(j) ∈ {0, 1} is purely random:
R(j) = ∆1 (j)B1 (j) + (1−∆1 (j)B1 (j)) ∆2 (j)B2 (j) + (1−∆1 (j)B1 (j)) (1−∆2 (j)B2 (j)) ∆3 (j)B3 (j)
+ · · ·+
(K−1∏
k=1
(1−∆k (j)Bk (j))
)
∆K (j)BK (j)
In this case we have 1−R(j) =
K∏
k=1
(1−∆k (j)Bk (j)), and it is easy to see that the response
behavior satisfies non decreasing requirement.
Another example could be R (j) = 1 (B (j) ≥ ∆ (j)).
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Proof of Proposition 1
The parameter ∆R writes as
∆R = E (y (1)− y (0) |R (1) = 1)
= E
(
y (1)R (1)− y (0)R (1)
)/
E (R (1))
= E
(
y (1)R (1)− y (0) (R (0) +R (1)−R (0) ))/E (R (1))
=
(
E (yR |T = 1)− E (yR |T = 0)
)/
E (R |T = 1)− E
(
y (0)
(
R (1)−R (0) ))/E (R (1))
Given the expression for the response rate,
E
(
y (0)R (j)
)
= E
(
y (0)G (B (j) ,∆ (j))
)
= E
(
E
(
y (0)G (B (j) ,∆ (j))
∣∣∣y (0) , B (j)))
= E
(
y (0)
∫
G (B (j) , x) f (x)
)
where f (x) is the distribution of ∆ (j) and does not depend on j by assumption. Let Ψ (X) =∫
G (X,x) f (x). As G is non decreasing in each component of X so is Ψ. We thus have
E
(
y (0)R (j)
)
= E
(
y (0) Ψ (B (j))
)
and
E
(
y (0) (R (1)−R (0))
)
= E
(
y (0)
(
Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0)) ))
Given monotonicity conditions Bk (1) ≥ Bk (0) ≥ 0, and Ψ non decreasing in each component,
we have Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0)) ≥ 0. Thus as m ≤ y (0) ≤M , we have
mE
(
Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0)) ) ≤ E(y (0) (R (1)−R (0))) ≤ME(Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0)) )
and thus
mE (R (1)−R (0)) ≤ E
(
y (0) (R (1)−R (0))
)
≤ME (R (1)−R (0))
which yields the result.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Consider E (yR |Z = 1)− E (yR |Z = 0). Given the assumption made, we have
E (yR |Z = 1) − E (yR |Z = 0)
= E (y (1)R (1)T (1) + y (0)R (0) (1− T (1)) |Z = 1)
− E (y (1)R (1)T (0) + y (0)R (0) (1− T (0)) |Z = 0)
= E (y (1)R (1)T (1) + y (0)R (0) (1− T (1)))
− E (y (1)R (1)T (0) + y (0)R (0) (1− T (0))) .
This can be easily rewritten as
E (yR |Z = 1) − E (yR |Z = 0)
= E ((y (1)− y (0)) (T (1)− T (0))R (1)
+ y (0) (R (1)−R (0)) (T (1)− T (0))) .
Considering y(1) = y(0) = 1 leads to
E (R |Z = 1) − E (R |Z = 0)
= E ((R (1)−R (0)) (T (1)− T (0))) .
Moreover,
E (TR |Z = 1) − E (TR |Z = 0)
= E (T (1)R (1)− T (0)R (1))
= E ((T (1)− T (0))R (1)) ,
thus
E (yR |Z = 1)− E (yR |Z = 0)
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0) = E ((y (1)− y (0)) |(T (1)− T (0))R (1) = 1)
+
E (y (0) (R (1)−R (0)) (T (1)− T (0)))
E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0) .
Notice also that given monotonicity of the treatment T (1) ≥ T (0), we have E ((T (1)− T (0))R (1)) ≥
0 and therefore E (TR |Z = 1)− E (TR |Z = 0) ≥ 0.
Like for proposition 1 we have
E
(
y(0) (R (1)−R (0)) (T (1)− T (0))
)
= E
(
y(0) (Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0))) (T (1)− T (0))
)
where Ψ (X) =
∫
G (X,x) f (x) dx with f being the distribution of ∆.
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Therefore, given monotonicity when y(0) ∈ [m,M ], we have
E
(
y (0)
(
R (1)−R (0) )(T (1)− T (0) )) ∈[
E
(
m (Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0))) (T (1)− T (0))
)
, E
(
M (Ψ (B (1))−Ψ (B (0))) (T (1)− T (0))
)]
that is
E
(
y (0)
(
R (1)−R (0) )(T (1)− T (0) )) ∈[
mE
((
R (1)−R (0) )(T (1)− T (0) )),ME((R (1)−R (0) )(T (1)− T (0) ))].
In the end we obtain
E
(
y (0)
(
R (1)−R (0) )(T (1)− T (0) )) ∈[
m
(
E (R |Z = 1)− E (R |Z = 0)
)
,M
(
E (R |Z = 1)− E (R |Z = 0)
)]
,
which yields the result.
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Table 1: Population sizes
Unemployment registers Enriched adm data Long telephone survey
Sample 8137 6176 4295
Weigthed population 37 564 30 579 18 787
Implied response rate 100% 81.2% 50%
Note : Response rates are computed using the sampling weights of the long telephone survey. In the case of the
enriched administrative data, the weights are multiplied by the sampling weights of the short telephone survey.
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Table 4: Impact of assignment on response
Enriched adm data Long telephone survey
Private scheme 0.0
(1.9)
5.6
(2.1)
Public scheme −0.8
(1.7)
2.4
(1.5)
Size 8137 8137
Note : Linear probability models for whether the employment status is available, in the enriched administrative
data and in the long telephone survey, respectively. Fixed effects by constant probability areas and by periods
have been introduced. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimations use sampling-weights of the long
telephone survey multiplied by sampling-weights of the short telephone survey in the enriched administrative
data.
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